Time for PGP signed sha256sums?
Previous discussion of this topic can be found here: https://forum.netgate.com/topic/60535/pfsense-image-hashes-folly
I've been looking around for mechanisms to verify the initial pfSense download, and it seems the sha256 sums are available for download from either https://files.pfsense.org/hashes/ or https://nyifiles.pfsense.org/mirror/downloads/ however there are no signature verification mechanisms which would authenticate the published hashes as genuine.
Previous discussions have pointed out that the web update facility does perform a signature check, but let me pose it like this: if you initially install a backdoored pfsense version it's doesn't have to perform a signature verification check.. it can just pretend to install updates.
I think being able to authenticate the initial pfsense download is pretty important. Without this, should an attacker compromise these servers they can recalculate the sha256sums of their backdoored pfsense version without detection.
I also think that PGP signature for sums or ISO image are needed.
It will also allow to verify locally the integrity and authenticity of install images, stored in the environment without access to the Internet.
And I think that efforts required to implement this is not so high to discard this idea.
Many users who put security at the forefront, will be grateful.