DNSCrypt for pfsense 2.3 :)
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how do you DNS forwarder in pfSense to point to 127.0.0.1?
what command? -
/usr/local/sbin/dnscrypt-proxy: Undefined symbol "crypto_core_hchacha20"
what does this means?
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"it serves just one singular purpose in the chain of networking"
For those users running in forwarder mode.. It has ZERO purpose when running resolver on pfsense. Which is the out of box configuration.. So while anyone creating packages for pfsense that work and add function is a good thing. Your audience is going to be very small imho..
Why is this a small audience? Anybody running a Pfsense router with a VPN will likely be forwarding requests to an upstream DNS server. That's a pretty common thing.
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"Anybody running a Pfsense router with a VPN will likely be forwarding requests to an upstream DNS server."
No.. Out of the box pfsense uses unbound as a resolver - not a forwarder, doesn't matter if you sending your traffic down a vpn or not. Out of the box your resolving - not forwarding. Dnscrypt has zero use in a resolver mode.
As to hiding your dns queries from your isp.. Again to be honest dnscrypt is pointless if your using a vpn anyway.. The actual valid use case where dnscrypt of any use at all is minuscule…
"The number of folks that understand what it does (and the limitations)"
Completely agree this statement.. To be honest most of the people that actually want to use it - don't actually know why.. They just hear the term dns leak, and oh my gawd did you hear that.. The black helicopters just went into whisper mode.. Those bastards!!!
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john the same can be said with vpn's tho.
I dont want my dns queries intercepted, I do want to connect to endpoints directly for performance reasons, dnscrypt is the solution in my case.
Setting up a vpn just to secure dns queries is way overkill and has performance implications.
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You did not understand what I said. DNSCrypt encrypts the contents of the DNS request/reply but your request to the web server will send the hostname in plain text in the request and the host is also visible in the certificate exchange. Read the text on their page, it isn't talking about their protocol but HTTPS and TLS in general.
Without a VPN, your request can be sniffed enough to tell where you're going even if it's not an exact full URL or page contents. You must use a VPN to hide that from your ISP or anyone intercepting your line.
If you think DNSCrypt without a VPN is doing anything for privacy you don't understand the limits/flaws of all the other protocols in play.
Use a VPN, don't bother with dnscrypt, you'll be better off. Or use both if you want, but the VPN part is non-negotiable if you want privacy. And of course the VPN has to be one with privacy-compatible policies and regulations.
Jim, you clearly do not see nor understand the real world use cases that DNSCrypt solves for. Take your average American ISP, who actively intercepts and manipulates their customers' DNS traffic in the name of profit (I am one such customer affected by these despicable practices). Encrypting DNS requests and responses completely mitigates their abilities to fiddle with traffic through DNS response manipulation. It has nothing to do with privacy, it has everything to do with preventing traffic manipulation via DNS - you need to comprehend this, because your replies here do nothing to show that you acknowledge the specific problem.
I agree that using a VPN is likely the best real world solution for privacy, but from a minimum viable product perspective all that the affected customers of these ISPs need to do (in today's landscape) is route HTTP (TCP/80) over the VPN tunnel. These ISPs run proxy servers to MiTM their customers' HTTP traffic - injecting ads into the plain text streams, there is clear evidence of this and it is something that can I can personally reproduce 100% of the time if I had to do so). They do not proxy HTTPS. Sure - they can scrape identifiable information from the encrypted streams to identify the hosts that are being requested, but in terms of traffic manipulation all that is needed is DNSCrypt to privatize DNS and a tunnel for plain text HTTP.
There is no need to tunnel HTTPS to combat this specific problem – they do not proxy or manipulate HTTPS traffic. Hopefully you're able to actually see what the problems are that DNSCrypt solves for.
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/usr/local/sbin/dnscrypt-proxy: Undefined symbol "crypto_core_hchacha20"
what does this means?
You need the new libsodium also, get it from here:
2.2/2.3: http://pkg.freebsd.org/FreeBSD:10:amd64/latest/All/libsodium-1.0.11_1.txz
2.4: http://pkg.freebsd.org/FreeBSD:11:amd64/latest/All/libsodium-1.0.11_1.txz(I'm following this instruction on how to setup DNSCrypt for my network, adding only "Query DNS servers sequentially" to make it finally works: http://ramirosalas.com/2015/07/installing-dnscrypt-in-pfssense/)
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what is the point of encrypting your DNS requests? Just resolve via pfsense and skip the middle man. If you really want to encrypt your DNS requests for tin hat purposes, why? Who do you think you're hiding from?
Don't get me wrong, I'm all for doing crazy hit tin hat things with pfsense just for no reason other than it's neat and you can.
But with DNS resolver and OpenVPN built into pfsense, what use case is there where DNS encryption is viable?
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what is the point of encrypting your DNS requests? Just resolve via pfsense and skip the middle man. If you really want to encrypt your DNS requests for tin hat purposes, why? Who do you think you're hiding from?
Don't get me wrong, I'm all for doing crazy hit tin hat things with pfsense just for no reason other than it's neat and you can.
But with DNS resolver and OpenVPN built into pfsense, what use case is there where DNS encryption is viable?
To escape DNS poisoning by my government? I also don't have much money to spare to buy a VPN service for my network…
I just want to be able to browse whatever sites I want at the speed that I paid for. I am not doing it for tin hat reasons.
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I'm not up to date with government level DNS poisoning, but wouldn't the resolver bypass that if it's passive? Unless you have an exceptionally shit government, no way am I buying that your pfsense box is going to hide you from a state…
$4/mo gets you VPN. -
I'm not up to date with government level DNS poisoning, but wouldn't the resolver bypass that if it's passive? Unless you have an exceptionally shit government, no way am I buying that your pfsense box is going to hide you from a state…
$4/mo gets you VPN.Indonesian government impose the ISPs to use transparent DNS proxy to filter DNS query againts a list (provided by the government) to many publicly known DNS server, such as Google's and OpenDNS' and many others that I tested, with something called "Internet Positif" . Read this if you want some more context. So, yeah, maybe my government is an exceptionally shitty one in this regard.
I'm not hiding from the state, I'm just bypassing their DNS poisoning.I was using an OpenWRT-based router to do this, but nowadays the traffic in my network is becoming much larger, the device I used cannot cope with that…
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That sucks man, but I think pfSense still has you covered with Resolver + DNSSEC doesn't it?
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/dns-best-practices.html#4
Domain Name System Security Extensions
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) adds security functions to the DNS protocol that can be used to prevent some of the attacks discussed in this document such as DNS cache poisoning. DNSSEC adds data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS protocol. DNSSEC specifications, implementation, and operational information is defined in multiple RFCs.
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That sucks man, but I think pfSense still has you covered with Resolver + DNSSEC doesn't it?
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/dns-best-practices.html#4
Domain Name System Security Extensions
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) adds security functions to the DNS protocol that can be used to prevent some of the attacks discussed in this document such as DNS cache poisoning. DNSSEC adds data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS protocol. DNSSEC specifications, implementation, and operational information is defined in multiple RFCs.
I think so too (AFAIK, DNSSEC is enabled by default?), but unfortunately it doesn't work… I tried to enable "Experimental Bit 0x20 Support" too, but it still doesn't work.
So, I had to resort to this method. -
Yeah my understanding is that if you check the DNSSEC box and Resolve with Unbound then you will use DNSSEC.
You aren't forwarding DNS are you? No DNS servers in general setup, dns server override is unchecked?
No DNS servers listed in your DHCP servers?In DNS Resolver
Enable DNSSEC checked
DNS Query Forwarding UNchecked
DHCP Registration UNchecked
Static DHCP UNcheckedon Advanced page:
Hide Identity
Hide Version
Harden DNSSEC, all three checkedFollow these instructions to make sure all traffic is using your resolver:
https://doc.pfsense.org/index.php/Redirecting_all_DNS_Requests_to_pfSenseTry these out to test
https://dnssec.vs.uni-due.de/
http://en.conn.internet.nl/connection/Should be working if setup like that.
If not, I know you don't want to pay for it but VPN might be your best option for something that is fully supported.
PIA has servers all over the world and you get 5 clients for $3.33/mo. There are plenty of tutorials specific to pfSense installations on here for either 128bit or 256bit encryption.
You can even set up all five clients on your router in a gateway group to utilize multiple cores and have more redundancy if you have a lot of clients, and you can use different servers on each client so that if one goes down or degrades you'll still have internet. -
You aren't forwarding DNS are you? No DNS servers in general setup, dns server override is unchecked?
No DNS servers listed in your DHCP servers?With DNSCrypt, I'm forwarding DNS…
I've tried your way, but, well.. something weird happened, I kinda have no internet connection after doing that, I mean, WhatsApp and steam still receive updates but no web browsing...
Here's my full DNS Resolver config:
=General DNS Resolver Options= Enable: Yes Listen Port: (default) Network Interfaces: All Outgoing Network Interfaces: All System Domain Local Zone Type: Transparent DNSSEC: Yes DNS Query Forwarding: No DHCP Registration: No Static DHCP: No No Custom Options =Advanced Resolver Options= Hide Identity: Yes Hide Version: Yes Prefecth Support: No Prefecth DNS Key Support: No Harden DNSSEC Data: Yes Message Cache Size: 4MB Outgoing TCP Buffers: 10 Incoming TCP Buffers: 10 EDNS Buffer Size: 4096 Number of Queries per Thread: 512 Jostle Timeout: 200 Maximum TTL for RRsets and Messages: 86400 Minimum TTL for RRsets and Messages: 0 TTL for Host Cache Entries: 15 minutes Number of Hosts to Cache: 10000 Unwanted Reply Threshold: Disabled Log Level: 1 Disable Auto-Added Access Control: No Experimental Bit 0x20 Support: NoI also tried clearing up DNS in General Setup and rebooted my router, APs, PC and phone.
Oh, and I forgot to mention, my ISP (the sole ISP for my area) doesn't allow bridge mode for connection, and so I set my pfsense router as a DMZ host.
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Yes, the destination domain is leaked over HTTP/HTTPS/TLS, but it's more strenuous for an entity who wants to listen on your line to examine HTTP/HTTPS traffic and manipulate it.
DNS traffic is trivially recorded, manipulated, and proxied transparently; HTTPS is not.
Don't think of DNSCrypt as a solution to total privacy or encryption, but certainly making it nontrivial for someone to spy on and/or manipulate your traffic is certainly a good value for such an easy setup.
DNSCrypt is like small lock on your luggage; it makes it just difficult enough for most people not to open it and just take something, but it wouldn't protect against someone who is highly determined. There are a massive amount of sniffers in the world, and giving them less data by encrypting DNS without sacrificing throughput or money from your pocket is… well... cool.
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The real question for me is "who's my opponent?" For me, the answer is "any of my service providers."
I run both dnscrypt and a VPN. Some of my traffic can't pass over the VPN - Netflix, some of the vehicle forums - because the websites reject connections from VPN providers.
My ISP resells an ATT product, and ATT has the worst possible privacy policies. The up side is that the ATT data cap doesn't apply, but the down side is that I'm transiting the ATT network. I don't let ATT see DNS requests in the clear any more than I have to. I use pfsense as my resolver for everything on the network, and pfsense runs its queries via dnscrypt once the system is fully up, and to cleartext servers earlier on in the startup process - pfsense is the only box on my network permitted to use outbound 53. In my design, traffic runs over VPN by default, but of course you have to get VPN and other services spun up during boot… (And no, this design isn't that popular in the house, since if I restart the box during the day, the time to fully operational is a little long.)
If my opponent was a government, there'd be precious little I could do if they decided to target a VPN. I expect there is covert access to most VPN providers' egress nodes and connection information - many companies don't log, but a government grade attacker with access to their colos could set up logging. Given the amount of play that VPN gets in the tech press, I think VPN colos are a target but I also think that the government would prefer not to launch prosecutions or share data with public companies gleaned from it. A court filing that admitted intercepting VPN providers en bloc would lead to another round of tut-tut in the press and would drop real threat actors off the technology.
By contrast, the public companies obviously share a ton of data with one another, and realistically, that's an opponent I can make life more annoying for. ATT knows I own an old Ford and knows when I'm watching Netflix. They also know that I make the rest of it a PITA to get into...
(Personally, I hope that a lot of the data the NSA is storing in Utah is Youtube videos being streamed over VPNs and awaiting decryption - but I suspect that they built themselves an easy button for intercepting and attributing VPN traffic long ago. On the other hand, given how much of the internet is devoted to Netflix content, perhaps some of the nonsense Netflix is doing with blocking VPNs and refusing to tell customers which hosts they need to bypass their VPN for is a policy set up at the request of entities which do bulk interception and got fed up with storing Netflix streams. The rationale for not telling people what hosts to permit access to makes no sense. My suricata DNS logs from the LAN interface were very helpful in figuring out which hosts I needed to have bypass the VPN.)
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…the down side is that I'm transiting the ATT network. I don't let ATT see DNS requests in the clear any more than I have to. I use pfsense as my resolver for everything on the network...
...pfsense is the only box on my network permitted to use outbound 53.
In my design, traffic runs over VPN by default,
but of course you have to get VPN and other services spun up during boot...
If you're only using pfSense to resolve all DNS for your network, and you're only letting traffic exit through your VPN client, why do you care about DNScrypt? Especially against AT&T? You aren't using their DNS servers, and you are encrypting all of your traffic to include your DNS requests.
And what do you mean you have to wait for VPN to spin up, and why would it matter from a privacy standpoint? My system runs OpenVPN, pfBlockerNG, Suricata, and other packages and if I reboot all services are up and running as soon as my system comes back online to be able to logon, and I boot from USB 2.0 flash drives.
No matter what, it doesn't matter from a privacy standpoint that they need to "spin up" if you are only letting your traffic exit on a VPN gateway, if the gateway isn't up, then traffic isn't leaving until it is up.
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I need some guidance please.
i use expressvpn for all traffic except;
- my work laptop which has its own vpn. i route the static ip out of the wan both so get both encrypted and unencrypted depending on vpn status
- i route my voip phone out of the wan port, because over the vpn i couldn't get it working reliablymy dns servers for pfsense are opendns and google.
i fail dns leak tests.if i understand correctly, in this scenario i should be using dnscrypt and redirecting all client dns requests to pfsense. is that correct?
