RFC (make up a number not in use) - Blueprint for setting up snort + pfblocker

Ramosel

@jflsakfja:

I'll be updating this topic for the last time in the coming days. After that, the suricata blueprint will take over.

First off, thank you for your efforts in this thread, I have found it most useful and the more I understand about it, most clever in its use and implementation of pfSense/pfBlocker/Snort as a system

I don't know that this is a question or just a curiosity… what I have read, questioned and talked to friends about in the Snort/Suricata debate, points to the big advantage of Suricata is its true "inline" functionality. At this time, it is my understanding that this true "inline" functionality can not be invoked under pfSense due to changes needed in pfSense itself. Given those two pieces of the puzzle, what would be the impetus for moving to Suricata "at this time"?

To further obfuscate the curiosity, the Snort fanboys insist that by the time pfSense gets "fixed" for the inline functionality that Snort will be updated to also offer this ability. My question then was whether an inline Snort would also require its own pfSense core change?… to which I got blank stares and silence.

Rick

bmeeks

@G.D.:

Thank you for the explanation. I appreciate it. It seems somewhat counter-intuitive to me that Snort would ignore the outgoing request for the prohibited resource, and only catch it on the way back, when the remote server starts transmitting to the local port.

I have much to learn about Snort.

The outgoing request from your LAN client may well not contain all the "triggers" needed by the rule. Only the data coming back contained everything necessary (and in the right order) to trigger the rule.

Bill

bmeeks

@Ramosel:

@jflsakfja:

I'll be updating this topic for the last time in the coming days. After that, the suricata blueprint will take over.

First off, thank you for your efforts in this thread, I have found it most useful and the more I understand about it, most clever in its use and implementation of pfSense/pfBlocker/Snort as a system

I don't know that this is a question or just a curiosity… what I have read, questioned and talked to friends about in the Snort/Suricata debate, points to the big advantage of Suricata is its true "inline" functionality. At this time, it is my understanding that this true "inline" functionality can not be invoked under pfSense due to changes needed in pfSense itself. Given those two pieces of the puzzle, what would be the impetus for moving to Suricata "at this time"?

To further obfuscate the curiosity, the Snort fanboys insist that by the time pfSense gets "fixed" for the inline functionality that Snort will be updated to also offer this ability. My question then was whether an inline Snort would also require its own pfSense core change?… to which I got blank stares and silence.

Rick

There are (well, actually, "will be") two ways to implement in-line mode in Snort and Suricata. One utilizes ipfw. This is the part of pfSense that today does not fully function in IPS mode. It's also the mode, that even if fixed to work, will still offer very poor performance throughput due to the swaps back and forth between kernel space and user land for packets. The other mechanism that really offers promise is Netmap. This is now part of FreeBSD 10, and I assume (but have not verified) it is in pfSense 2.2. There is a feature request that is currently showing as 50% complete in the Suricata source tree to add a Netmap API module so that Suricata can use it. I'm not sure why the feature is not 100% finished yet.

Back to Snort. Snort's DAQ module that does all the packet acquisition can utilize ipfw on BSD systems to do in-line drops. I have not seen anything about Netmap support in Snort yet, though. Somebody may be contemplating it, but I did not see any links in my initial searches.

So to summarize – the ideal way forward is to use the Netmap support in FreeBSD 10 as the architecture for implementing inline IPS in Suricata (and maybe even Snort). However, we are now in a waiting game while those two upstream source trees fully incorporate Netmap support. In my view, ipfw is probably a lost cause due first to the potential performance issues, and second to the fact it would have to be updated in the pfSense code in order to work correctly.

As to liking Suricata over Snort (or vice-versa), that is really mostly personal preference at this time. Maybe if Suricata gets full Netmap support and Snort does not, then the choice becomes more clear cut.

Bill

@Ramosel:

@jflsakfja:

I'll be updating this topic for the last time in the coming days. After that, the suricata blueprint will take over.

First off, thank you for your efforts in this thread, I have found it most useful and the more I understand about it, most clever in its use and implementation of pfSense/pfBlocker/Snort as a system

I don't know that this is a question or just a curiosity… what I have read, questioned and talked to friends about in the Snort/Suricata debate, points to the big advantage of Suricata is its true "inline" functionality. At this time, it is my understanding that this true "inline" functionality can not be invoked under pfSense due to changes needed in pfSense itself. Given those two pieces of the puzzle, what would be the impetus for moving to Suricata "at this time"?

To further obfuscate the curiosity, the Snort fanboys insist that by the time pfSense gets "fixed" for the inline functionality that Snort will be updated to also offer this ability. My question then was whether an inline Snort would also require its own pfSense core change?… to which I got blank stares and silence.

Rick

Snort inline is dead. Any hope of resurrecting the project (coming from die hard snort fans, companies funneling trillions of $ into snort inline, fanbois, not related passers by) is nothing more than a hope. As an added nail in snort inline's coffin is that pretty much all development for it has stopped when suricata was born, since most (all?) developers (wrt inline) moved over to that project.

Just to put it in plain sight: snort inline is DEAD. Any future posts mentioning snort inline should be accompanied by "R.I.P. snort inline". If you want that functionality, migrate to suricata. As for all the (inevitably) coming [citation needed] posts, I'm not the one saying snort inline is dead, migrate to suricata. It's actually snort inline's site. Here I'll make everybody's life easier: http://snort-inline.sourceforge.net/

Right now the best course forward is to work as much as we can to get suricata fully functional under pfsense. Even if the inline part doesn't get implemented for another 40 years, the foundations will be there when it does. I know this will upset everybody related to snort, but now that cisco has taken over snort, I'm waiting for the announcement that snort will no longer be supported any day now. Maybe tomorrow. Maybe the day after that. Maybe next week. It WILL be here eventually.

This is the final rule post in this topic. Moving forward, the rules will be found in the suricata topic, which I'll create in a couple of days. I strongly advise all to move to suricata and stop using snort.

With that out of the way, here's the rule updates:

In tab "Rules", under "Category" select:
(–- means blank table at time of writing)

Auto-Flowbit rules > all except:
8478 FILE-IDENTIFY Microsoft Office Publisher file magic detected
23714 FILE-IDENTIFY Microsoft Office Publisher file magic detected

DISABLED:2

emerging-activex > all

DISABLED:0

emerging-attack_responses > all

DISABLED:0

DO NOT USE! > emerging-botcc > use pfblocker with: http://rules.emergingthreats.net/fwrules/emerging-Block-IPs.txt <<< CARE!!! a lot of IRC servers are listed here. Try it first, an IRC network that you need to work, doesn't, then remove it.

emerging-chat > all except:
2010784 ET CHAT Facebook Chat (send message)
2010785 ET CHAT Facebook Chat (buddy list)
2010786 ET CHAT Facebook Chat (settings)
2010819 ET CHAT Facebook Chat using XMPP
2002327 ET CHAT Google Talk (Jabber) Client Login
2002334 ET CHAT Google IM traffic Jabber client sign-on
2001241 ET CHAT MSN file transfer request
2001242 ET CHAT MSN file transfer accept
2001243 ET CHAT MSN file transfer reject
2001682 ET CHAT MSN IM Poll via HTTP
2002192 ET CHAT MSN status change
2008289 ET CHAT Possible MSN Messenger File Transfer
2009375 ET CHAT General MSN Chat Activity
2009376 ET CHAT MSN User-Agent Activity
2001595 ET CHAT Skype VOIP Checking Version (Startup)
2002157 ET CHAT Skype User-Agent detected
2003022 ET CHAT Skype Bootstrap Node (udp)
2000355 ET CHAT IRC authorization message [stops IRC from working]
2002024 ET CHAT IRC NICK command [stops IRC from working]
2002028 ET CHAT IRC PONG response [stops IRC from working]
2002025 ET CHAT IRC JOIN command [stops IRC from working]
2002026 ET CHAT IRC PRIVMSG command [stops IRC from working]

DISABLED:22

DO NOT USE! > emerging-ciarmy > use pfblocker with: http://www.ciarmy.com/list/ci-badguys.txt

DO NOT USE! > emerging-compromised > use pfblocker with: http://rules.emergingthreats.net/blockrules/compromised-ips.txt

emerging-current_events > all
2014527 ET CURRENT_EVENTS Exploit Kit Delivering Compressed Flash Content to Client <<< Tired of manually cleaning up after this one.

DISABLED:1

emerging-deleted > –-

emerging-dns > all except:
2008446 ET DNS Excessive DNS Responses with 1 or more RR's (100+ in 10 seconds) - possible Cache Poisoning Attempt
2008470 ET DNS Excessive NXDOMAIN responses - Possible DNS Backscatter or Domain Generation Algorithm Lookups
2001117 ET DNS Standard query response, Name Error

DISABLED:3

emerging-dos > all

DISABLED:0

DO NOT USE! > emerging-drop > use pfblocker with: http://list.iblocklist.com/?list=sh_drop&fileformat=p2p

DO NOT USE! > emerging-dshield > use pfblocker with: http://rules.emergingthreats.net/blockrules/compromised-ips.txt

emerging-exploit > all except:
2001058 ET EXPLOIT libpng tRNS overflow attempt
2002913 ET EXPLOIT VNC Client response
2002914 ET EXPLOIT VNC Server VNC Auth Offer
2002919 ET EXPLOIT VNC Good Authentication Reply
2002915 ET EXPLOIT VNC Authentication Reply
2002758 ET EXPLOIT WMF Escape Record Exploit - Version 1
2002742 ET EXPLOIT WMF Escape Record Exploit - Version 3

DISABLED:7

emerging-ftp > all
2010731 ET FTP FTP CWD command attempt without login

DISABLED:1

emerging-games > all

DISABLED:0

emerging-icmp > ---

emerging-icmp_info > ---

emerging-imap > ---

emerging-inappropriate > all except:
2002925 ET INAPPROPRIATE Google Image Search, Safe Mode Off
2001608 ET INAPPROPRIATE Likely Porn

DISABLED:2

emerging-info > all except:
2014472 ET INFO JAVA - Java Archive Download
2014473 ET INFO JAVA - Java Archive Download By Vulnerable Client
2014819 ET INFO Packed Executable Download
2015016 ET INFO FTP STOR to External Network
2015561 ET INFO PDF Using CCITTFax Filter
2015744 ET INFO EXE IsDebuggerPresent (Used in Malware Anti-Debugging)
2016360 ET INFO JAVA - ClassID
2016361 ET INFO JAVA - ClassID
2016404 ET INFO MPEG Download Over HTTP (1)
2015674 ET INFO 3XX redirect to data URL
2016847 ET INFO Possible Chrome Plugin install
2017669 ET INFO Zip File

DISABLED:12

emerging-malware > all except:
2008438 ET MALWARE Possible Windows executable sent when remote host claims to send a Text File
2012228 ET MALWARE Suspicious Russian Content-Language Ru Which May Be Malware Related
2012229 ET MALWARE Suspicious Chinese Content-Language zh-cn Which May be Malware Related

DISABLED:3

emerging-misc > all

DISABLED:0

emerging-mobile_malware > all except:
2012251 ET MOBILE_MALWARE Google Android Device HTTP Request
2012848 ET MOBILE_MALWARE Possible Mobile Malware POST of IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity in URI

DISABLED:2

emerging-netbios > all

DISABLED:0

emerging-p2p > all except:
2000369 ET P2P BitTorrent Announce
2007727 ET P2P possible torrent download
2008581 ET P2P BitTorrent DHT ping request
2008583 ET P2P BitTorrent DHT nodes reply
2008585 ET P2P BitTorrent DHT announce_peers request
2010144 ET P2P Vuze BT UDP Connection (5)
2011699 ET P2P Bittorrent P2P Client User-Agent (Transmission/1.x)
2016662 ET P2P Possible Bittorrent Activity - Multiple DNS Queries For tracker hosts
2014734 ET P2P BitTorrent - Torrent File Downloaded
2003317 ET P2P Edonkey Search Request (any type file)
2009971 ET P2P eMule KAD Network Hello Request (2)
2013869 ET P2P Torrent Client User-Agent (Solid Core/0.82)

DISABLED:12

emerging-policy > all except:
2000419 ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file download
2000428 ET POLICY ZIP file download
2001115 ET POLICY MSI (microsoft installer file) download
2003595 ET POLICY exe download via HTTP - Informational
2001898 ET POLICY eBay Bid Placed
2001907 ET POLICY eBay Placing Item for sale
2001908 ET POLICY eBay View Item
2001909 ET POLICY eBay Watch This Item
2003303 ET POLICY FTP Login Attempt (non-anonymous)
2003410 ET POLICY FTP Login Successful
2003121 ET POLICY docs.google.com Activity
2003597 ET POLICY Google Calendar in Use
2002801 ET POLICY Google Desktop User-Agent Detected
2002838 ET POLICY Google Search Appliance browsing the Internet
2000035 ET POLICY Hotmail Inbox Access
2000036 ET POLICY Hotmail Message Access
2000037 ET POLICY Hotmail Compose Message Access
2000038 ET POLICY Hotmail Compose Message Submit
2000039 ET POLICY Hotmail Compose Message Submit Data
2008238 ET POLICY Hotmail Inbox Access
2008239 ET POLICY Hotmail Message Access
2008240 ET POLICY Hotmail Compose Message Access
2008242 ET POLICY Hotmail Access Full Mode
2006408 ET POLICY HTTP Request on Unusual Port Possibly Hostile
2006409 ET POLICY HTTP POST on unusual Port Possibly Hostile
2002330 ET POLICY Google Talk TLS Client Traffic
2002332 ET POLICY Google IM traffic Windows client user sign-on
2002333 ET POLICY Google IM traffic friend invited
2002878 ET POLICY iTunes User Agent
2002722 ET POLICY MP3 File Transfer Outbound
2002723 ET POLICY MP3 File Transfer Inbound
2001114 ET POLICY Mozilla XPI install files download
2001973 ET POLICY SSH Server Banner Detected on Expected Port
2001974 ET POLICY SSH Client Banner Detected on Expected Port
2001975 ET POLICY SSHv2 Server KEX Detected on Expected Port
2001976 ET POLICY SSHv2 Client KEX Detected on Expected Port
2001977 ET POLICY SSHv2 Client New Keys detected on Expected Port
2001978 ET POLICY SSH session in progress on Expected Port
2001979 ET POLICY SSH Server Banner Detected on Unusual Port
2001980 ET POLICY SSH Client Banner Detected on Unusual Port
2001981 ET POLICY SSHv2 Server KEX Detected on Unusual Port
2001982 ET POLICY SSHv2 Client KEX Detected on Unusual Port
2001983 ET POLICY SSHv2 Client New Keys Detected on Unusual Port
2001984 ET POLICY SSH session in progress on Unusual Port
2009001 ET POLICY Login Credentials Possibly Passed in URI
2009004 ET POLICY Login Credentials Possibly Passed in POST Data
2003214 ET POLICY Pingdom.com Monitoring detected
2003215 ET POLICY Pingdom.com Monitoring Node Active
2001669 ET POLICY Proxy GET Request
2001670 ET POLICY Proxy HEAD Request
2001674 ET POLICY Proxy POST Request
2001675 ET POLICY Proxy CONNECT Request
2002922 ET POLICY VNC Authentication Successful
2002920 ET POLICY VNC Authentication Failure
2003026 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 443 being excluded from SSL Alerts
2004598 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 9001 (aol) being excluded from SSL Alerts
2003027 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 8000 being excluded from SSL Alerts
2003028 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 8080 being excluded from SSL Alerts
2003029 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 8200 being excluded from SSL Alerts
2003030 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 8443 being excluded from SSL Alerts
2003033 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 2967 (Symantec) being excluded from SSL Alerts
2003035 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 3128 (proxy) being excluded from SSL Alerts
2003036 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 8080 (proxy) being excluded from SSL Alerts
2003037 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 8292 (Bloomberg) being excluded from SSL Alerts
2003038 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 8294 (Bloomberg) being excluded from SSL Alerts
2003934 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 1521 (Oracle) being excluded from SSL Alerts
2008543 ET POLICY Known SSL traffic on port 995 (imaps) being excluded from SSL Alerts
2003002 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Client Hello on Unusual Port TLS
2003003 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Client Hello on Unusual Port SSLv3
2003004 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Client Hello on Unusual Port Case 2
2003005 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Client Hello on Unusual Port SSLv3
2003006 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Client Key Exchange on Unusual Port
2003007 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Client Key Exchange on Unusual Port SSLv3
2003008 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Client Cipher Set on Unusual Port
2003009 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Client Cipher Set on Unusual Port SSLv3
2003010 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Server Hello on Unusual Port
2003011 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Server Hello on Unusual Port SSLv3
2003012 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Server Certificate Exchange on Unusual Port
2003013 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Server Certificate Exchange on Unusual Port SSLv3
2003014 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Server Key Exchange on Unusual Port
2003015 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Server Key Exchange on Unusual Port SSLv3
2003018 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Server Cipher Set on Unusual Port
2003019 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Server Cipher Set on Unusual Port SSLv3
2003020 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Encrypted Application Data on Unusual Port
2003021 ET POLICY TLS/SSL Encrypted Application Data on Unusual Port SSLv3
2007671 ET POLICY Binary Download Smaller than 1 MB Likely Hostile
2001449 ET POLICY Proxy Connection detected
2002822 ET POLICY Wget User Agent
2002823 ET POLICY POSSIBLE Web Crawl using Wget
2002824 ET POLICY CURL User Agent
2002934 ET POLICY libwww-perl User Agent
2002828 ET POLICY Googlebot User Agent
2002829 ET POLICY Googlebot Crawl
2002830 ET POLICY Msnbot User Agent
2002831 ET POLICY Msnbot Crawl
2002832 ET POLICY Yahoo Crawler User Agent
2002833 ET POLICY Yahoo Crawler Crawl
2010228 ET POLICY Suspicious Microsoft Windows NT 6.1 User-Agent Detected
2002948 ET POLICY External Windows Update in Progress
2002949 ET POLICY Windows Update in Progress
2001402 ET POLICY ZIPPED DOC in transit
2001403 ET POLICY ZIPPED XLS in transit
2001404 ET POLICY ZIPPED EXE in transit
2001405 ET POLICY ZIPPED PPT in transit
2011874 ET POLICY NSPlayer User-Agent Windows Media Player streaming detected
2012647 ET POLICY Dropbox.com Offsite File Backup in Use
2012648 ET POLICY Dropbox Client Broadcasting
2013028 ET POLICY curl User-Agent Outbound
2013030 ET POLICY libwww-perl User-Agent
2013031 ET POLICY Python-urllib/ Suspicious User Agent
2013290 ET POLICY MOBILE Apple device leaking UDID from SpringBoard via GET
2013414 ET POLICY Executable served from Amazon S3
2013458 ET POLICY Facebook Like Button Clicked (1)
2013459 ET POLICY Facebook Like Button Clicked (2)
2013503 ET POLICY OS X Software Update Request Outbound
2013504 ET POLICY GNU/Linux APT User-Agent Outbound likely related to package management
2013505 ET POLICY GNU/Linux YUM User-Agent Outbound likely related to package management
2014297 ET POLICY Vulnerable Java Version 1.7.x Detected
2014313 ET POLICY Executable Download From DropBox
2014919 ET POLICY Microsoft Online Storage Client Hello TLSv1 Possible SkyDrive (1)
2014920 ET POLICY Microsoft Online Storage Client Hello TLSv1 Possible SkyDrive (2)
2017015 ET POLICY DropBox User Content Access over SSL
2001375 ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (16 digit spaced)
2001376 ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (16 digit dashed)
2001377 ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (16 digit)
2001378 ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (15 digit)
2001379 ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (15 digit spaced)
2001380 ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (15 digit dashed)
2001381 ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (14 digit)
2001382 ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (14 digit spaced)
2001383 ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (14 digit dashed)
2009293 ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (15 digit spaced 2)
2009294 ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (15 digit dashed 2)
2001328 ET POLICY SSN Detected in Clear Text (dashed)
2001384 ET POLICY SSN Detected in Clear Text (spaced)
2007971 ET POLICY SSN Detected in Clear Text (SSN )
2007972 ET POLICY SSN Detected in Clear Text (SSN# )
2011854 ET POLICY Java JAR file download
2002749 ET POLICY Unallocated IP Space Traffic - Bogon Nets <<<<<<<< handled by ticking block bogon networks in interface settings
2002752 ET POLICY Reserved Internal IP Traffic <<<<<<<<<<<<< handled by ticking block private networks in interface settings
2000418 ET POLICY Executable and linking format (ELF) file download
2002658 ET POLICY EIN in the clear (US-IRS Employer ID Number)
2016877 ET POLICY Unsupported/Fake FireFox Version 2.
2013296 ET POLICY Free SSL Certificate Provider (StartCom Class 1 Primary Intermediate Server CA)
2010815 ET POLICY Incoming Connection Attempt From Amazon EC2 Cloud
2013255 ET POLICY Majestic12 User-Agent Request Inbound
2014726 ET POLICY Outdated Windows Flash Version IE
2012911 ET POLICY URL Contains password Parameter
2011085 ET POLICY HTTP Redirect to IPv4 Address
2009303 ET POLICY MediaFire file download service access
2000356 ET POLICY IRC connection [stops IRC from working, misses a lot of real IRC connections]
2012141 ET POLICY Protocol 41 IPv6 encapsulation potential 6in4 IPv6 tunnel active <<< Breaks IPv6 Tunnels

DISABLED:152

emerging-pop3 > –-

DO NOT USE! > emerging-rbn-malvertisers > use pfblocker with: !!!LIST REMOVED!!! LOOKING FOR SUGGESTIONS

DO NOT USE! > emerging-rbn > use pfblocker with: !!!LIST REMOVED!!! LOOKING FOR SUGGESTIONS

emerging-rpc > ---

emerging-scada > all

DISABLED:0

emerging-scan > all except
2002992 ET SCAN Rapid POP3 Connections - Possible Brute Force Attack
2002993 ET SCAN Rapid POP3S Connections - Possible Brute Force Attack
2002994 ET SCAN Rapid IMAP Connections - Possible Brute Force Attack
2002995 ET SCAN Rapid IMAPS Connections - Possible Brute Force Attack
2011367 ET SCAN TCP Traffic (ET SCAN Malformed Packet SYN FIN)
2000538 ET SCAN NMAP -sA (1) <<< FP when accessing certain sites over IPv6

DISABLED:6

emerging-shellcode > all except
2011803 ET SHELLCODE Possible TCP x86 JMP to CALL Shellcode Detected
2012252 ET SHELLCODE Common 0a0a0a0a Heap Spray String
2012257 ET SHELLCODE Common %0c%0c%0c%0c Heap Spray String
2012510 ET SHELLCODE UTF-8/16 Encoded Shellcode
2013222 ET SHELLCODE Excessive Use of HeapLib Objects Likely Malicious Heap Spray Attempt
2013267 ET SHELLCODE Hex Obfuscated JavaScript Heap Spray 0a0a0a0a
2012256 ET SHELLCODE Common 0c0c0c0c Heap Spray String

DISABLED:7

emerging-smtp > all

DISABLED:0

emerging-snmp > all

DISABLED:0

emerging-sql > all

DISABLED:0

emerging-telnet > all

DISABLED:0

emerging-tftp > all

DISABLED:0

DO NOT USE! > emerging-tor > use pfblocker with http://list.iblocklist.com/?list=tor&fileformat=p2p

emerging-trojan > all except:
2009205 ET TROJAN Possible Downadup/Conficker-C P2P encrypted traffic UDP Ping Packet (bit value 1)
2009206 ET TROJAN Possible Downadup/Conficker-C P2P encrypted traffic UDP Ping Packet (bit value 4)
2009207 ET TROJAN Possible Downadup/Conficker-C P2P encrypted traffic UDP Ping Packet (bit value 5)
2009208 ET TROJAN Possible Downadup/Conficker-C P2P encrypted traffic UDP Ping Packet (bit value 16)
2001046 ET TROJAN UPX compressed file download possible malware
2016950 ET TROJAN Possible Win32/Hupigon ip.txt with a Non-Mozilla UA

DISABLED:6

emerging-user_agents > all except:
2010697 ET USER_AGENTS Suspicious User-Agent Beginning with digits - Likely spyware/trojan

DISABLED:1

emerging-voip > all

DISABLED:0

emerging-web_client > all except
2011347 ET WEB_CLIENT Possible String.FromCharCode Javascript Obfuscation Attempt
2011507 ET WEB_CLIENT PDF With Embedded File
2010518 ET WEB_CLIENT Possible HTTP 404 XSS Attempt (External Source)
2012056 ET WEB_CLIENT Flash Player Flash6.ocx AllowScriptAccess Denial of Service
2012075 ET WEB_CLIENT Possible Internet Explorer CSS Parser Remote Code Execution Attempt
2012119 ET WEB_CLIENT Possible Hex Obfuscation Usage On Webpage
2012205 ET WEB_CLIENT Possible Malicious String.fromCharCode with charCodeAt String
2012266 ET WEB_CLIENT Hex Obfuscation of unescape % Encoding
2012272 ET WEB_CLIENT Hex Obfuscation of eval % Encoding
2012398 ET WEB_CLIENT Hex Obfuscation of replace Javascript Function % Encoding
2010527 ET WEB_CLIENT Possible HTTP 503 XSS Attempt (External Source)
2010931 ET WEB_CLIENT Possible IE iepeers.dll Use-after-free Code Execution Attempt
2011764 ET WEB_CLIENT Possible Microsoft Internet Explorer mshtml.dll Timer ID Memory Pointer Information Disclosure Attempt

DISABLED:13

emerging-web_server > all except
2003099 ET WEB_SERVER Poison Null Byte
2015526 ET WEB_SERVER Fake Googlebot UA 1 Inbound
2015527 ET WEB_SERVER Fake Googlebot UA 2 Inbound
2016676 ET WEB_SERVER SQL Errors in HTTP 200 Response (ORA-)
2016672 ET WEB_SERVER SQL Errors in HTTP 200 Response (error in your SQL syntax)
2009151 ET WEB_SERVER PHP Generic Remote File Include Attempt (HTTP)

DISABLED:5

emerging-web_specific_apps > all except:
2010890 ET WEB_SPECIFIC_APPS phpBB3 registration (Step1 GET)
2010891 ET WEB_SPECIFIC_APPS phpBB3 registration (Step2 POST)
2010892 ET WEB_SPECIFIC_APPS phpBB3 registration (Step3 GET)
2010893 ET WEB_SPECIFIC_APPS phpBB3 registration (Step4 POST)
2003508 ET WEB_SPECIFIC_APPS Wordpress wp-login.php redirect_to credentials stealing attempt

DISABLED:5

emerging-worm > all

DISABLED:0

GPLv2 community rules > all except
254 DNS SPOOF query response with TTL of 1 min. and no authority
384 PROTOCOL-ICMP PING
385 PROTOCOL-ICMP traceroute
399 PROTOCOL-ICMP Destination Unreachable Host Unreachable
402 PROTOCOL-ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable
408 PROTOCOL-ICMP Echo Reply
540 POLICY-SOCIAL Microsoft MSN message
648 INDICATOR-SHELLCODE x86 NOOP
649 INDICATOR-SHELLCODE x86 setgid 0
1200 INDICATOR-COMPROMISE Invalid URL
1201 INDICATOR-COMPROMISE 403 Forbidden
1292 INDICATOR-COMPROMISE directory listing
1390 INDICATOR-SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP
1394 INDICATOR-SHELLCODE x86 inc ecx NOOP
1437 FILE-IDENTIFY Microsoft Windows Media download detected
1841 FILE-OTHER Oracle Javascript URL host spoofing attempt
1846 POLICY-MULTIMEDIA vncviewer Java applet download attempt
1852 SERVER-WEBAPP robots.txt access
1986 POLICY-SOCIAL Microsoft MSN outbound file transfer request
1988 POLICY-SOCIAL Microsoft MSN outbound file transfer accept
1989 POLICY-SOCIAL Microsoft MSN outbound file transfer rejected
1990 POLICY-SOCIAL Microsoft MSN user search
1991 POLICY-SOCIAL Microsoft MSN login attempt
2180 PUA-P2P BitTorrent announce request
2181 PUA-P2P BitTorrent transfer
2707 FILE-IMAGE JPEG parser multipacket heap overflow
3463 SERVER-WEBAPP awstats access
25518 OS-OTHER Apple iPod User-Agent detected
25519 OS-OTHER Apple iPad User-Agent detected
25520 OS-OTHER Apple iPhone User-Agent detected
25521 OS-OTHER Android User-Agent detected
25522 OS-OTHER Nokia User-Agent detected
25523 OS-OTHER Samsung User-Agent detected
25524 OS-OTHER Kindle User-Agent detected
25525 OS-OTHER Nintendo User-Agent detected
2417 PROTOCOL-FTP format string attempt
1377 PROTOCOL-FTP wu-ftp bad file completion attempt
1378 PROTOCOL-FTP wu-ftp bad file completion attempt

DISABLED:38

IPS Policy - Security > all except
19436 BROWSER-IE Microsoft Internet Explorer CStyleSheetRule array memory corruption attempt
18196 BROWSER-IE Microsoft Internet Explorer CSS importer use-after-free attempt
16482 BROWSER-IE Microsoft Internet Explorer userdata behavior memory corruption attempt
25459 FILE-PDF Adobe Reader incomplete JP2K image geometry - potentially malicious
16320 WEB-CLIENT Adobe PNG empty sPLT exploit attempt
15975 WEB-CLIENT OpenOffice TIFF file in little endian format parsing integer overflow attempt
15976 WEB-CLIENT OpenOffice TIFF file in big endian format parsing integer overflow attempt
13360 APP-DETECT failed FTP login attempt
23098 FILE-MULTIMEDIA Adobe Flash Player MP4 sequence parameter set parsing overflow attempt
14772 WEB-CLIENT libpng malformed chunk denial of service attempt
29466 FILE-OTHER Corel PDF fusion XPS stack buffer overflow attempt
27948 FILE-OFFICE Microsoft Office Excel rtMergeCells heap overflow attempt
17153 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox plugin parameter array dangling pointer exploit attempt - 1 <<< Affects systems running the Firefox ActiveX control (firefox 3.6.7). No longer needed, delete upstream.
17154 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox plugin parameter array dangling pointer exploit attempt - 2 <<< Affects systems running the Firefox ActiveX control (firefox 3.6.7). No longer needed, delete upstream.
19713 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Array.reduceRight integer overflow <<< Affects Firefox v1.0-4.0.1. No longer needed, delete upstream.
19714 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Array.reduceRight integer overflow <<< Affects Firefox v1.0-4.0.1. No longer needed, delete upstream.
19321 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Products nsCSSValue Array Index Integer Overflow <<< Affects Firefox v3.5.1-3.6.6. No longer needed, delete upstream.
19292 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox appendChild use-after-free attempt <<< Affects Firefox v3.5-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
19078 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox html tag attributes memory corruption <<< Affects Firefox v3.5-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
19077 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox appendChild use-after-free attempt <<< Affects Firefox v3.5-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
19076 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox appendChild use-after-free attempt <<< Affects Firefox v3.5-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
17804 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox html tag attributes memory corruption <<< Affects Firefox v3.5-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
25233 BROWSER-FIREFOX appendChild multiple parent nodes stack corruption attempt <<< Affects Firefox v1.0-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
25232 BROWSER-FIREFOX appendChild multiple parent nodes stack corruption attempt <<< Affects Firefox v1.0-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
25228 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox iframe and xul element reload crash attempt <<< Affects Firefox v1.0-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
25227 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox iframe and xul element reload crash attempt <<< Affects Firefox v1.0-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
24994 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox onChannelRedirect method attempt <<< Affects Firefox v1.0-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
24188 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Array.reduceRight integer overflow <<< Affects Firefox v1.0-4.0.1. No longer needed, delete upstream.
24187 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Array.reduceRight integer overflow <<< Affects Firefox v1.0-4.0.1. No longer needed, delete upstream.
21363 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox appendChild use-after-free attempt <<< Affects Firefox v3.5-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
20072 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox nsTreeRange Use After Free attempt <<< Affects Firefox v1.0-3.6.9. No longer needed, delete upstream.
16502 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox WOFF font processing integer overflow attempt - CFF-based <<< Affects Firefox v3.6. No longer needed, delete upstream.
16501 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox WOFF font processing integer overflow attempt - TrueType <<< Affects Firefox v3.6. No longer needed, delete upstream.
29503 BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Products SVG text content element getCharNumAtPosition use after free attempt <<< Affects Firefox v1.0-5.0. No longer needed, delete upstream.

DISABLED:34

preprocessor.rules > all except (first_column:second_column details)
119:2 HI_CLIENT_DOUBLE_DECODE
119:4 HI_CLIENT_BARE_BYTE
119:7 HI_CLIENT_IIS_UNICODE
119:14 HI_CLIENT_NON_RFC_CHAR
119:31 HI_CLIENT_UNKNOWN_METHOD
119:32 HI_CLIENT_SIMPLE_REQUEST
119:33 HI_CLIENT_UNESCAPED_SPACE_IN_URI <<< FPs all over the place. Especially fun when it bans a cdn's ip. That's when calls start coming in. Fun!
120:2 HI_SERVER_INVALID_STATCODE
120:3 HI_SERVER_NO_CONTLEN
120:4 HI_SERVER_UTF_NORM_FAIL
120:6 HI_SERVER_DECOMPR_FAILED
120:8 HI_CLISRV_MSG_SIZE_EXCEPTION
120:9 HI_SERVER_JS_OBFUSCATION_EXCD
120:10 HI_SERVER_JS_EXCESS_WS
122:1 PSNG_TCP_PORTSCAN
122:4 PSNG_TCP_DISTRIBUTED_PORTSCAN
122:5 PSNG_TCP_FILTERED_PORTSCAN <<< Fires up on our remote monitoring servers
122:17 PSNG_UDP_PORTSCAN
122:20 PSNG_UDP_DISTRIBUTED_PORTSCAN
124:3 SMTP_RESPONSE_OVERFLOW
124:10 SMTP_B64_DECODING_FAILED
124:11 SMTP_QP_DECODING_FAILED <<< FPs seen coming from normal email sources
125:1 FTPP_FTP_TELNET_CMD
125:2 FTPP_FTP_INVALID_CMD
125:7 FTPP_FTP_ENCRYPTED
125:9 FTPP_FTP_EVASIVE_TELNET_CMD
137:1 SSL_INVALID_CLIENT_HELLO
141:1 IMAP_UNKNOWN_CMD <<< pending upstream update
141:2 IMAP_UNKNOWN_RESP <<< pending upstream update
145:2 DNP3_DROPPED_FRAME
DISABLED>>>30

DO NOT USE! > sensitive-data.rules > NONE enabled

Suppression list:

#GLOBAL

gen_id 1

suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 536
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 653
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2452
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 11192
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 15306
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 16313
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 17458
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 20583
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2000334
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2008120
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2010516
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 20122758
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2014518
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2014520
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2100366
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2100368
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2100651
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2101390
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2101424
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2102314
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2103134
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 2500056
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 100000230
suppress gen_id 3, sig_id 14772
#(IMAP) Unknown IMAP4 command
suppress gen_id 141, sig_id 1

pfBlocker extra lists:
TYPE LIST
txt http://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt
txt http://www.spamhaus.org/drop/edrop.txttxt http://www.spamhaus.org/drop/edrop.txt

Mr. Jingles

@jflsakfja:

This is the final rule post in this topic. Moving forward, the rules will be found in the suricata topic, which I'll create in a couple of days. I strongly advise all to move to suricata and stop using snort.

I am somewhat of a fan of your writing style ever since I discovered you and I speak the same secret agents stuff (update, btw, the yellow cat is in the bathroom, I repeat: rain is expected this summer :P )

;D

Anyhow, I do appreciate very much what you are doing for us all, and I've followed most of what you've written here. I even like your rants ;D

But:

It is not quite clear why you write the part in bold in the above quote. Yes, I've read 'snort-inline is dead' (whatever that means precisely :-[ ), but Bmeeks writes above that he is not particularly advocating the one over the other right now (Snort/Suricata).

So, my dear ranting man who knows secret stuffs ( ;D ): could I persuade you to write a little bit more about why move to Suricata [b]right now?

Thank you,

Bye,

bmeeks

@Hollander:

But:

It is not quite clear why you write the part in bold in the above quote. Yes, I've read 'snort-inline is dead' (whatever that means precisely :-[ ), but Bmeeks writes above that he is not particularly advocating the one over the other right now (Snort/Suricata).

So, my dear ranting man who knows secret stuffs ( ;D ): could I persuade you to write a little bit more about why move to Suricata [b]right now?

Thank you,

Bye,

There is one area, for home users, where Snort currently still has an edge. That edge is the affordability of "current" rules updates. For Snort VRT rules, the cost is $29.99 USD per year. For Emerging Threats, you have to go with ET-PRO and I think that is close to $500 USD per year. Last time I checked, the ET folks did not have a home-user level of subscription. Suricata will not process all of the Snort VRT rules because some of them have rule option keywords that only Snort recognizes and processes. So for those folks who maintain a Snort VRT subscription but use the rules on Suricata, be aware that not all of the rules will actually inspect traffic. Make sure you always look in the suricata.log file on the LOGS BROWSER tab to see what (if any) Snort rules Suricata choked on and skipped loading.

Both vendors (Snort VRT and Emerging Threats) offer free rules updates, but those are 30-day old rules at best. And for ET, I think some of their more advanced malware and Trojan rules may never make it into the free updates.

Performance wise Snort and Suricata on pfSense are pretty evenly matched as of now. And for use in a commercial environment where you are subscribing to either Snort VRT updates or Emerging Threats PRO updates, there is really no huge difference in protection.

Bill

BBcan177

"Emerging Threats" had a deal (if you call it a deal) for the ET PRO ruleset at ~$300 awhile back? Not sure if its still available.

Jflsakfja's Blueprint for ET will be the same for either Snort or Suricata. Only issue is as Bill Stated that approx 600 Snort rules will not load in Suricata due to incompatible Regex issues. (Maybe these rules are already in the ET rulesets. I have never investigated that.)

A couple of months back I contacted the snort guys to remove some rules that were carved in stone back in pre-historic times, since the stone was chipped and some pieces of it went missing. A few thousand years later, the rules are still there, and that's why I decided to contact them. They completely ignored me, thinking (and if any of them passes by here, please confirm) that no matter how old a rule is, it's still worth it to spend the man hours to maintain it. That's one X for snort.

You can see based on Bill's posts and mine around here that snort hasn't updated the imap commands yet. A critical part of an IDS for an "enterprise" use is therefore missing. That's two Xs for snort.

snort-inline. No need to comment on this, other than R.I.P. snort-inline. Three Xs so far. At this very same point, snort was voted out of the game. We decided to give it another chance though.

suricata comes along with its (far) superior stream and detection engine. Fanboysm aside, suricata was directly funded by the U.S. government for use as a toy in NSA's plans. As always, NEVER trust a single word, let alone a dot, of what I say. You can verify everything I say online. If it's good for them, it sure as hell it's good for me. That funding gave birth to a system that can max out a 10Gbps duplex connection, and have spare cycles to render a 3D video, at the same time. As it stands >right now<, comparing snort and suricata, suricata offers the ability to take advantage of our systems at their max potential, as they are right now. Since most people followed another member's advise (and basically ignored me), they used i3+ systems. Those systems went underutilized so far, since I have mentioned a (few) thousand times that snort doesn't actually act on the original packet, but a copy of the packet. To put it simply, the less than a handful of forum members that did decide to take my advice, saw snort running as fast on a p4 as an overclocked i7. Then again, who am I to know, right? Those systems (i3+) are completely ready for suricata's inline part, and will max out more bandwidth than you can afford. This is a HUGE advantage to suricata over snort.

Suricata is like building a solid foundation for the future. Think of it like snort on steroids. Better log management, better capture facilities. When the inline part finally arrives in pfsense, that will transform pfsense into a multi million $ firewall system, capable of taking even the best of the best on (cough USISC, later assimilated into NETCOM).

Speed wise, they both are pretty much the same as it stands right now.

Putting both systems side by side, most users will not notice the difference, right now. A year later when the inline part arrives, those users will run around reconfiguring their systems from the ground up. The rest of us will just tick a checkbox and forget about it.

For the upcoming suricata topic, I've decided to completely ignore the snort rules. Those rules that made it into ET (gpl for example) will be there, since they are technically part of ET, but the rest will be ignored. I believe it's best if we cut all ties with snort and let it die the horrendous death it deserves.

WRT the money needed for a subscription, I would prefer it if anyone finds any of the two topics interesting, instead of contacting me for donations, they donate to ET by purchasing a subscription. Rule maintainers have to make a living you know.

bmeeks

@jflsakfja:

A couple of months back I contacted the snort guys to remove some rules that were carved in stone back in pre-historic times, since the stone was chipped and some pieces of it went missing. A few thousand years later, the rules are still there, and that's why I decided to contact them. They completely ignored me, thinking (and if any of them passes by here, please confirm) that no matter how old a rule is, it's still worth it to spend the man hours to maintain it. That's one X for snort.

You can see based on Bill's posts and mine around here that snort hasn't updated the imap commands yet. A critical part of an IDS for an "enterprise" use is therefore missing. That's two Xs for snort.

snort-inline. No need to comment on this, other than R.I.P. snort-inline. Three Xs so far. At this very same point, snort was voted out of the game. We decided to give it another chance though.

suricata comes along with its (far) superior stream and detection engine. Fanboysm aside, suricata was directly funded by the U.S. government for use as a toy in NSA's plans. As always, NEVER trust a single word, let alone a dot, of what I say. You can verify everything I say online. If it's good for them, it sure as hell it's good for me. That funding gave birth to a system that can max out a 10Gbps duplex connection, and have spare cycles to render a 3D video, at the same time. As it stands >right now<, comparing snort and suricata, suricata offers the ability to take advantage of our systems at their max potential, as they are right now. Since most people followed another member's advise (and basically ignored me), they used i3+ systems. Those systems went underutilized so far, since I have mentioned a (few) thousand times that snort doesn't actually act on the original packet, but a copy of the packet. To put it simply, the less than a handful of forum members that did decide to take my advice, saw snort running as fast on a p4 as an overclocked i7. Then again, who am I to know, right? Those systems (i3+) are completely ready for suricata's inline part, and will max out more bandwidth than you can afford. This is a HUGE advantage to suricata over snort.

Suricata is like building a solid foundation for the future. Think of it like snort on steroids. Better log management, better capture facilities. When the inline part finally arrives in pfsense, that will transform pfsense into a multi million $ firewall system, capable of taking even the best of the best on (cough USISC, later assimilated into NETCOM).

Speed wise, they both are pretty much the same as it stands right now.

Putting both systems side by side, most users will not notice the difference, right now. A year later when the inline part arrives, those users will run around reconfiguring their systems from the ground up. The rest of us will just tick a checkbox and forget about it.

For the upcoming suricata topic, I've decided to completely ignore the snort rules. Those rules that made it into ET (gpl for example) will be there, since they are technically part of ET, but the rest will be ignored. I believe it's best if we cut all ties with snort and let it die the horrendous death it deserves.

WRT the money needed for a subscription, I would prefer it if anyone finds any of the two topics interesting, instead of contacting me for donations, they donate to ET by purchasing a subscription. Rule maintainers have to make a living you know.

Very well said. I would like to see the Emerging Threats guys offer a slightly more affordable subscription package for home users. $300-$500 USD bruises your wallet quite a bit more than $29.99 USD. For a commercial entity, it's a complete no-brainer. For home enthusiasts, it might be harder to get approval from the better half for $500… ;)...after all, that could buy another set of curtains or maybe that dress she has been looking at... ;D.

Bill

@bmeeks:

Very well said. I would like to see the Emerging Threats guys offer a slightly more affordable subscription package for home users. $300-$500 USD bruises your wallet quite a bit more than $29.99 USD. For a commercial entity, it's a complete no-brainer. For home enthusiasts, it might be harder to get approval from the better half for $500… ;)...after all, that could buy another set of curtains or maybe that dress she has been looking at... ;D.

Bill

Even for a commercial entity, $300 here, $300 there, quickly adds up to bills waiting to be paid next year and continues until the business goes bust.

What I would be more that willing to pay? $50/year/pc. Everybody is happy. A home user is unlikely to install the rules on more than 1 pc, so the cost is kept low. An enterprise is not likely to install the rules on more than a dozen PCs, again cost is proportionate to the stuff you get out of them. And the best part is rule maintainers gets payed as well, from everybody.

Since this topic has evolved into a "security" "experts" (not meaning to offend anyone here, it's directed at the individuals charging a few millions a year to provide network "security", yet still connect a scada system on the internet), why not move it up a notch and ridicule the MBAs as well, with a short lesson on how to build a solid successful business.

Lets say you are selling a blank box. You start your company saying "hey, if I sell even 1 of them for a million dollars, I'd be a millionaire!". So you set the initial price for a blank box for 1 million $. You set up a factory to produce them, hire workers, build your new store, and wait. Days, months, years go by, and you are sitting at your new store, waiting for someone to come in and sell them that box to be a millionaire. 20 years later, after racking up a 60 million $ total bill (electricity,workers, etc.) a box collector comes in to your store. He is totally amazed at the quality and design of your box, and is willing to buy one right now. Your reply is "what good is 1 million when I have to pay 60?" and reluctantly sell a box. 5 years later, the business goes bankrupt.

Now let's examine the example of someone trained by me personally. He knows the secret to a successful business is repeated business. He sets up a factory, and hires a single worker, automating most of the process of manufacturing a box. He sets up the new store, with samples of the new boxes. His secret is his price. He charges $1 for each new box, while everybody else charges $2. His total expenses to manufacture that box amount up to 50% of its price (cardboard,electricity,worker's salary split over the amount of boxes he can make in a shift, etc etc). He earns a respectable 50% on each box sold. A store owner passes by the new store and sees the prices and falls in love with them. He storms into the shop, already signing a check for a 100,000 pieces order. He is also willing to sign a contract for monthly delivery of boxes to his store. At his next golf game, he can't stop talking to his buddies about the extremely low priced boxes he bought. One of those buddies is a shoe making business owner. He walks into the new store the very next day, with a 200,000 pieces contract waiting to be signed. Everyone that passes by the store is stunned by the price. Their reaction is "ZOMG!!!111oneelevenhundredandelevenWTF!?!? THESE BOXES ARE HALF THE PRICE OF ALL OTHER BOXES". A year later the business has grown so much, it now employees 20 guys in the factory, and has opened up a dozen new stores. The business owner is also a millionaire, and has set up the foundation for the future.

Those 2 examples come directly from stuff I've seen in my life, and although they seem off topic for most people, are actually spot on topic.

What is the operational expense for a PC downloading the ET rules? If I say $500, I'd be willingly lying out of my teeth. I'm sorry guys, but I cannot do that. The operational expense for a single PC downloading the rules is not more than $10. What does it take to keep those rules updated? I'm sure an out of job developer would be more than willing to spend a few hours a week maintaining the rules, for $500 a month.

Making a profit FROM A SINGLE PC means charging $520/subscription (for $10 profit per subscription)

Spreading the profit onto a thousand PCs, means charging $20.50 (for $10 profit per subscription).

See where I'm getting at? You could even charge $50 and people would think "it's a f***ing steal!", yet you would be making 39.50/subscription. Just scale up from there and build a successful business on repeated business.

Mr. Jingles

@jflsakfja:

why not move it up a notch and ridicule the MBAs as well, with a short lesson on how to build a solid successful business.

Finally something I can say something about with complete backing of my education (I hold quite some degrees in this very area) ;D ;D ;D

Not all 'MBA's' are the same: unfortunately around 95% of them are. And are exactly what you describe. This in itself has no longer anything to do with education, and as such I'd like to quote one of my favourite quotes:

Hyperinflation is not restricted to monetary events

With which I am referring to the current education scam, that is hitting the youngsters hard. As such, a simple google will lead you to many articles (even from trustworthy sites) about the insane college tuition bubbles that have been blewn around the world.

That aside: what you are illustrating is somebody who did not ever complete macro-economics 101, let alone even an introduction to Marketing, more specifically SOP, Sales & Operations Planning. Because in there we teach the simple concept of supply and demand. Most people know these two words, but they don't know that in SOP we use this to determine the optimal sales price. All others assumed standard, that means that sales price in which our profits are maximized.

The last lines of you are what is called 'marginal profitability'. Which specifically goes for digital goods, where the marginal profitability is around 100%. Given the concept of 'sunk cost', it means you, for short term sales pricing, should accept any price above the variable cost. Of course, if you are a victim of 1 of these 95%-'MBA's' you will pick the highest price you can think of. If you are one of the 5%, you know about SOP ;D

I by the way have a subscription to Snort, and the 30 USD/year is most fair. Obviously, somebody over there understands SOP. I also contacted the people over at ET some time ago, and was amazed by their arrogance, even when I explained SOP and marginal profits to them, in an attempt to have them lower the price to the levels of Snort for home users. And this only goes to prove the quote I put above. Hyperinflation is also observed in signatures of rather moron-alike people like the severely mentally handicapped person I had the chat with. He was a very important [fill in all kinds of expensive sounding words here] 'senior' 'manager' who told me: 'we don't care about your explanations, obviously, if you don't want to pay our price, you are not the customer we are looking for'.

I think it is all these processed foods people eat that have evaporated their brains :'(

( ;D )

Mr. Jingles

@jflsakfja:

A couple of months –-SNIP ---

I forgot: thanks for the clarification :D

(As to paying ET as you suggest: I have no problem with that, but I explained right above this reply from me what mentally deceased person I had the pleasure of communicating with trying to get a home-user affordable price).

fearnothing

A little help with the snort configuration you suggested on the first page - just how much memory does it need? I threw 4GB at the setup thinking that would be plenty but whenever I try to enable one of the larger groups like ET-trojan.rules or ET-malware.rules, snort turns itself off for that interface.

Jun 9 16:29:21 	check_reload_status: Syncing firewall
Jun 9 16:29:21 	php: /snort/snort_rulesets.php: [Snort] Updating rules configuration for: LAN ...
Jun 9 16:29:23 	php: /snort/snort_rulesets.php: [Snort] Enabling any flowbit-required rules for: LAN...
Jun 9 16:29:23 	php: /snort/snort_rulesets.php: [Snort] Building new sig-msg.map file for LAN...
Jun 9 16:29:27 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: Toggle (snort starting) for LAN(LAN)...
Jun 9 16:29:27 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Updating rules configuration for: WAN ...
Jun 9 16:29:27 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Enabling any flowbit-required rules for: WAN...
Jun 9 16:29:27 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Building new sig-msg.map file for WAN...
Jun 9 16:29:27 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Updating rules configuration for: LAN ...
Jun 9 16:29:29 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Enabling any flowbit-required rules for: LAN...
Jun 9 16:29:29 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Building new sig-msg.map file for LAN...
Jun 9 16:29:30 	check_reload_status: Syncing firewall
Jun 9 16:29:30 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Snort START for LAN(em1)...

And that's the last line - no actual error, just snort no longer running on the interface. Is it memory? If not, what else is going on?

bmeeks

@fearnothing:

A little help with the snort configuration you suggested on the first page - just how much memory does it need? I threw 4GB at the setup thinking that would be plenty but whenever I try to enable one of the larger groups like ET-trojan.rules or ET-malware.rules, snort turns itself off for that interface.

Jun 9 16:29:21 	check_reload_status: Syncing firewall
Jun 9 16:29:21 	php: /snort/snort_rulesets.php: [Snort] Updating rules configuration for: LAN ...
Jun 9 16:29:23 	php: /snort/snort_rulesets.php: [Snort] Enabling any flowbit-required rules for: LAN...
Jun 9 16:29:23 	php: /snort/snort_rulesets.php: [Snort] Building new sig-msg.map file for LAN...
Jun 9 16:29:27 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: Toggle (snort starting) for LAN(LAN)...
Jun 9 16:29:27 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Updating rules configuration for: WAN ...
Jun 9 16:29:27 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Enabling any flowbit-required rules for: WAN...
Jun 9 16:29:27 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Building new sig-msg.map file for WAN...
Jun 9 16:29:27 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Updating rules configuration for: LAN ...
Jun 9 16:29:29 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Enabling any flowbit-required rules for: LAN...
Jun 9 16:29:29 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Building new sig-msg.map file for LAN...
Jun 9 16:29:30 	check_reload_status: Syncing firewall
Jun 9 16:29:30 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: [Snort] Snort START for LAN(em1)...

And that's the last line - no actual error, just snort no longer running on the interface. Is it memory? If not, what else is going on?

I found some posts via a Google search on the Snort mailing lists (or maybe it was Google Groups…) about the 2.9.6.0 version gobbling up memory fairly aggressively in higher traffic situations. This could also happen with lots of rules enabled. The ET-Trojan and ET-Malware rules groups are a bit large. There are settings for memory caps for the various preprocessors on the PREPROCESSORS tab. Adjusting those may help. It's also not outside the realm of possibility the Snort binary for this version (2.9.6.0) has a hidden bug. Signal 11 means a SEGFAULT occurred (or in less geeky terms, some piece of code tried to write to or access memory outside of its assigned address space). At least one other user had some "snort exited on signal 11" messages in their log during rule updates.

Bill

With regards to RAM usage, I've never seen snort go above 40% on a 2GB system.set up identical to this topic.

fearnothing

OK some more info here:
Using the Connectivity ruleset, 17% of 3051MB usage. And that's without most of the EmergingThreats rules.
Using the Security ruleset, 82%.

I was amused to see this in my log one of the times it failed…

Jun 9 19:27:50 	php: /snort/snort_interfaces.php: The command '/usr/local/bin/snort -R 60190 -D -q -l /var/log/snort/snort_em160190 --pid-path /var/run --nolock-pidfile -G 60190 -c /usr/pbi/snort-i386/etc/snort/snort_60190_em1/snort.conf -i em1' returned exit code '255', the output was 'Spawning daemon child... My daemon child 35849 lives... Daemon parent exiting (-1)'

Is there some way to export the config file so you can have a look to see what I might have done wrong?

Let me take a wild guess that you are using AC. Use AC-BNFA.

EDIT: Actually AC-BNFA-NQ

fearnothing

Actually, AC-STD. However I seem to have solved it with the following process:

Set the search method to AC-BNFA - this brought memory usage down to 10%
Enable the desired rules - memory usage 13%
Change search method back to AC-STD - memory usage 14%.
Voila!

And it will choke on the next rule update. Please use AC-BNFA-NQ. AC-BNFA-NQ replaced AC-BNFA, which in turn replaced AC*. Trust me, I was running AC-BNFA-NQ on multiple production networks, and I haven't created a black hole while doing so.