Does he really have to use profanity all thru the video? Makes him look really immature.

I don't think its that big a deal but these guys need something to write about I guess.

And now you are chatting me? Ohhhhhh…  Yeah.  You are screwed for sure. Seriously, these days I'd be surprised if some public service wasn't archived forever...

$csrf = substr($buffer, strpos($buffer,'sid:') , 110); Actually needs to be $csrf = substr($buffer, strpos($buffer,'sid:') , 55); in order to get the csrf token working. This is because the token length is 55.

We're doing some internal testing yet but it is quite close.

The abacus doesn't even need to exist.  ;) http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20775-mental-abacus-does-away-with-words.html Steve

And if you stop applying patches then you won't get new Microsoft bugs.

Thinking back, I had to buy an winsock2 software just to get wfw 3.11 to connect to the internets..

@stan-qaz: From the first link: We built two working privilege escalation exploits that use this effect. One exploit uses rowhammer-induced bit flips to gain kernel privileges on x86-64 Linux when run as an unprivileged userland process. When run on a machine vulnerable to the rowhammer problem, the process was able to induce bit flips in page table entries (PTEs). It was able to use this to gain write access to its own page table, and hence gain read-write access to all of physical memory. So it isn't a random flip and hope issue but something that can be targeted at a specific machine. Yeh, that's why I put "random" in quotes. It takes some number of (re)writes to for the bit flips to happen, and it depends on analog charge leakage properties of the memory storage locations. That will vary from location to location, chip to chip, brand to brand… So any attack can be statistically targeted in a way that does make it "possible" to achieve bit flips in something like the bit pattern the attacker is aiming for. The articles I have seen do not give any idea about how well targeted the bit flipping can be in real life - i.e. on a typical real-world system with other user processes doing real stuff, how many times does the attacking code bugcheck the system, compared to achieving exploitable privilege escalation without bugchecking the system.

To make sheeples see green instead of red….

I think this article nails the case. they have my market at #1 checkmated by Verizon. Totally correct as well. http://www.techrepublic.com/article/the-google-fiber-lottery/

HFSC is inter-queue and FAIRQ is intra-queue. Another way to put it is HFSC decides which queue goes next and FAIRQ decides which packets leave a queue.

https://blog.pfsense.org/?p=1588 Now hook in some BSDploy (http://docs.bsdploy.net/en/latest/)

@phil.davis: FreeBSD 11.0-CURRENT Release Notes: https://www.freebsd.org/relnotes/CURRENT/relnotes/ That is an ongoing set of release notes that are updated as things happen. There is also https://wiki.freebsd.org/WhatsNew/FreeBSD11 Looking at, potentially, the most important section of that for the average pfSense usr: Support for linking NIC Receive Side Scaling (RSS) to the network stack's connection-group implementation (r263198) We actually (privately) support this by loaning a set of 10G and 40G cards to the individual doing this work.  It won't have a large impact on pfSense (yet), because it is all being done first to support reception on the box, rather than forwarding through it. Support for the UDP-Lite protocol (RFC 3828) has been added to both IPv4 and IPv6 stacks (r264212) I doubt anyone cares (yet), and this was already in FreeBSD 10.1 (and thus pfSense 2.2) for IPv4. IPX is no longer supported (r263140) Hurray! AppleTalk is no longer supported (r263152) Hurray! Flowid, bindmulti and RSS awareness have been added to the IPv6 stack (r268562) See above where we support this via loaned cards to the developer RSS awareness has been added to the igb(4) driver (r268028) RSS awareness has been added to the ixgbe(4) driver (r268029) These are Intel 1Gbps and 10Gbps cards.  Please see the paper, "Measure Twice, Code Once: Network Performance Analysis for FreeBSD" to be given by George Neville-Neil and myself at AsiaBSDcon in March.  I won't reveal the contents of the paper, but I will reveal that pfSense 2.2 is significantly faster than 11-CURRENT with a NODEBUG kernel. netstat can display RSS and flow information with -R (r266448) See above. PF hash has been changed from Jenkins to Murmur3 which shows a conservative 3% increase in packets per second (r272906) We're the party responsible for making this happen.  (It was George Neville-Neil and I.) and it's already in pfSense 2.2, btw. Netmap support has been added to libpcap allowing tcpdump and other native pcap application to run directly on netmap ports (r272659) this is (just) importing more of Luigi's latest work. faith(4) and faithd( 8 ) have been removed from base (r274331) Hurray! cxgbe(4) will now front loads as much as possible before any driver lock or software queue gets involved (r276485) Chelsio cards.  There was a useless panic removed yesterday as well. @phil.davis: Is there a "roadmap" document somewhere that has a target timetable for 11.0-RELEASE and what is hoped to be in it? It's not that time, yet.    Nor is this the FreeBSD-CURRENT forum. The other major thing that is in pfSense 2.2 that is not yet in FreeBSD are the changes to the IPsec stack to support AES-GCM, enabling AES-NI accelerated IPsec.  Make no mistake, it's going in FreeBSD, it's just that the work isn't done, yet.