What is the biggest attack in GBPS you stopped
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Good thinking, could not say if its correct or not as I have no knowledge of how the different consumer
routers work, they might for example have different levels of isolation or sandboxing in place.In normal as I am informed, correct me please if I am wrong with this, the NAT mechanism is working
like this (related to the consumer grade NAT routers), the way ste-by-step I mean;- rule number one is often using netfilter (SPI) in that game to prevent from IP packet fragmentations
- the second rule is something like "use rule number one on top of all other rules then followed by NAT
- from the LAN side someone or a device is calling an information such like a website to open and display
- the informations are send to the Internet by opening a session for this related to an internal IP address
- if data now from the outside (Internet) are reaching the WAN interface of the home router, the NAT
mechanism is purely and only checking if there is an open session that is matching this data and let
them pass or deny them.
And for sure on top of this, perhaps also a smaller soldered on board ASIC/FPGA that brings them
up to handle those rules and actions more liquid I am really pretty sure they own all something like this.I now I am walking now on so called thin ice
For sure from vendor to vendor this might be used in different ways, but it is really affective
working for them, so could pfSense or FreeBSD also going to solve this out like this is done?And if the most peoples want to go more likes the style is now, no problem at all I thing, it might
be not working only as a replacement, an extension or only as another option for the state of
art, the pfSense is acting and handling this point now at the time, but perhaps something like
a second option where each user will be able to set it up or activate it or may not perhaps.However from the freebsd thread SYN ACK seems to be an issue.
But you are perhaps a programmer or code writer that is able to determinate now
where are the exactly differences between this both SPI/NAT versions?Put another way, until we log at greater detail how will we spot problems?
You will be able to sniff, syslog and debug for many years something and millions of clean
code audits on top, if the mechanism it selfs (SPI/NAT) is the point we have to come closerI dont know if this would work, by altering the number of retries?
Hey, can this combined together by using syncookies against syn flood attacks?
I am not a code writer or FreeBSD and pfSense professional and also not a security
expert likes many users are here in this forum are, and this may be bringing me up
to ask some poor questions that makes more or long time experienced users and the
pros up to be running wild, but if there is out something else "they" have and not "we"
and it is still working likes a charm you will perhaps excuse the jumping in to this discussion. -
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc756722%28v=ws.10%29.aspx
I think the issue is how NAT is handled and whats done to the traffic in the queue. I dont know how deep this goes but it could be different things.
I dont have any waiting hardware wise and its internal to FreeBSD/pfSense.
It could be the backlog and the way its handled when SYN flooded and also the fact that all traffic is copied to pf filter and inspected and then its forwarded/rejected or whatever its supposed to do…
That we have a bottleneck in that way the packets are handled using NAT. The script used spoofed IP's and is a DDoS. The traffic will at a point be flushed and then the firewall begins to route traffic again until we hit the bottlenneck again and everything halts and become unresponsive.
1 core suddenly uses 100% of the CPU and it stalls depite having enough ressources available.
So its tied to PPS and how they are composed and what the traffic wants in regards to reply from the FW. And not the overall bandwith usage.
One can monitor the usage of CPU in VmWare and see what happens hardware wise when the traffic drops on the traffic graphs. It follow suit in VmWare and everything is reachable from WAN again.
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@BlueKobold:
You will be able to sniff, syslog and debug for many years something and millions of clean
code audits on top, if the mechanism it selfs (SPI/NAT) is the point we have to come closerpfsense has packet capture but its limited ie it falls over after a period of time.
Syslog is not detailed enough in places.
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@SM, Have you tried a DMZ with two firewalls?
That way you can offload some work from the front facing fw, and other stuff can run on the rear facing fw?
I know most OS'es as in servers and desktop's have a fw of sorts, but in my experience they are really quite basic not worth relying on which is why my preferred setup is to have two fw's in place with different OS's running as monocultures are never good.
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https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc756722%28v=ws.10%29.aspx
I think the issue is how NAT is handled and whats done to the traffic in the queue. I dont know how deep this goes but it could be different things.
I mean the differences between this different translation methods as described here;
Methods of translationis to have two fw's in place with different OS's running as monocultures are never good.
This is owed to the circumstance, if over one system a bug or issue came out it would not be affecting both
Firewalls. -
@KOM:
So we can't expect the pfSense team to fix a problem that's not in pfSense, and they are at the mercy of the FreeBSD code releases.
While we can't expect them to, they certainly have fixed some FreeBSD bugs and submitted the patches upstream, which were accepted for inclusion by the FreeBSD team.
Yup. And if there were truly a world-is-ending issue here, we'd already have done the same already.
All firewalls require some degree of tuning to stand up to resource exhaustion attacks. Settings appropriate for such circumstances aren't defaults because they would break many more circumstances than they would help, as they're too aggressive for many VoIP configurations, among other possible problems. Also general default behaviors that most people want, like logging all blocked traffic, are really terrible in that circumstance. Among a variety of other problems I've pointed out with the scenarios in these threads.
I've seen enough of Supermule's super-secret DDoS stuff from when he (or someone using something similar) DDoSed this forum several times, and some things I've gathered from others, to be able to put together a proper analysis to get upstream at some point.
It's all doable with hping or other tools. Supermule uses shady illegal services you pay for in Bitcoin that use criminal-run botnets. The same circumstance can be lab replicated without paying criminals.
Investigating this further is still on my radar. There have just been real problems that affect many reasonable real world use cases that have taken precedence. Anyone trying to stop DDoS with a firewall of any type is doing it wrong.
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I thought DTrace was getting nowhere because it requires ESF to include it in the version of freebsd they use with pfsense?
You need more than just dtrace, various other debug options like PMC, and it needs to be replicated on stock FreeBSD with as basic of a test case as possible. We're not holding anything up there if someone wants to do it right. Doing it right doesn't involve "watch my Youtube videos of what happens when I have a criminal botnet hit me with traffic I won't describe, using an undocumented configuration that's full of sub-optimal settings for standing up to resource exhaustion attacks."
Doing it right would entail:
take this pf.conf
run this against it
end result is: …So it's clear what's being done, the end result, and how to replicate. There's no big secret in how to run a large scale SYN flood where the world would end if it was put out there.
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There was nothing distributed about it unless Supermule has a botnet at his disposal and that's why he's not releasing any code
He's admitted to using a criminal-run botnet, which apparently isn't as strong as it used to be as machines have gotten cleaned.
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I missed this along the line. But it does explain why he has been unable or unwilling to offer details about the attack method.
@cmb:
He's admitted to using a criminal-run botnet, which apparently isn't as strong as it used to be as machines have gotten cleaned.
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So you are not sure??
Just because I pissed you off…
I thought you were older than the "name calling" age.
Tell me what I used... And since you have offered little to no help at all in configuring these "sub optimal" configurations, its very clear to everybody that nothing good comes from ESF other than bickering and "sub optimal" communication.
If I really DDoS'ed you then you wouldnt be online yet.
@cmb:
@KOM:
So we can't expect the pfSense team to fix a problem that's not in pfSense, and they are at the mercy of the FreeBSD code releases.
While we can't expect them to, they certainly have fixed some FreeBSD bugs and submitted the patches upstream, which were accepted for inclusion by the FreeBSD team.
Yup. And if there were truly a world-is-ending issue here, we'd already have done the same already.
All firewalls require some degree of tuning to stand up to resource exhaustion attacks. Settings appropriate for such circumstances aren't defaults because they would break many more circumstances than they would help, as they're too aggressive for many VoIP configurations, among other possible problems. Also general default behaviors that most people want, like logging all blocked traffic, are really terrible in that circumstance. Among a variety of other problems I've pointed out with the scenarios in these threads.
I've seen enough of Supermule's super-secret DDoS stuff from when he DDoSed our forum several times (not going to believe it wasn't him), and some things I've gathered from others, to be able to put together a proper analysis to get upstream at some point.
It's all doable with hping or other tools. Supermule uses shady illegal services you pay for in Bitcoin that use criminal-run botnets. The same circumstance can be lab replicated without paying criminals.
Investigating this further is still on my radar. There have just been real problems that affect many reasonable real world use cases that have taken precedence. Anyone trying to stop DDoS with a firewall of any type is doing it wrong.
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I have offered numerous suggestions throughout your threads. If you want in-depth help with your configuration, purchase support, and we'll be glad to assist. Ultimately there's only so much you can do, because firewalls are the wrong answer to DDoS, but it's not horrible in any reasonable circumstance. If you'd even just provide a useful problem report, I would pursue from there.
If you think nothing good comes out of here, you should pay a lot more attention. Both here, and to the complete mess your buddy Franco is presiding over. We're getting serious work put into FreeBSD (passwd/group file corruption, AES-NI and AES-GCM, fixed DHCPv6 PD in ISC dhcpd port, just in the last month or so), have a power cycling chaos monkey proving we can now stand up to limitless back-to-back-to-back power cycles in worst-case file writing scenarios (where opnsense might last a handful, and probably 1-2 == dead box), while they still haven't fixed half the bugs we fixed between 2.2-BETA and 2.2.0-REL much less anything since and all the things they broke.
We're getting damn good stuff done. One of the future things you'll see is extremely high performance packet filtering. Which is ultimately what is needed for large scale DDoS handling purposes. While FreeBSD pf has improved significantly in performance over the years, and beats OpenBSD significantly on multi-core systems, there is still a lot of work to do there (or switch to a diff packet filter entirely) to make it multi-Mpps/new connections/sec capable.
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Thing is Chris… Franco is very kind to people.
I dont really dig into the opnsense/pfsense feud since its meaningless.
What I do mind, is that if people treat me nice, then I am nice to them and vice versa.
In regards to Opnsense, then I believe they are moving along quite nicely putting out a lot of updates very quickly. They chose a different path than ESF and thats about it.
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You hired a power-cycling monkey? I'm pretty sure I'm qualified for that one…
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How much power does the cycling monkey have?
Can it beat Chris Froome?
Should I hire it to pedal on the back of my tandem? -
@cmb:
I have offered numerous suggestions throughout your threads. If you want in-depth help with your configuration, purchase support, and we'll be glad to assist. Ultimately there's only so much you can do, because firewalls are the wrong answer to DDoS, but it's not horrible in any reasonable circumstance. You've turned into an impossible to satisfy asshole here, while kissing ass on that other forum you love so much.
If you think nothing good comes out of here, you should pay a lot more attention. Both here, and to the complete mess your buddy Franco is presiding over. We're getting serious work put into FreeBSD (passwd/group file corruption, AES-NI and AES-GCM, fixed DHCPv6 PD in ISC dhcpd port, just in the last month or so), have a power cycling chaos monkey proving we can now stand up to limitless back-to-back-to-back power cycles in worst-case file writing scenarios (where opnsense might last a handful, and probably 1-2 == dead box), while they still haven't fixed half the bugs we fixed between 2.2-BETA and 2.2.0-REL much less anything since and all the things they broke.
We're getting damn good stuff done. One of the future things you'll see is extremely high performance packet filtering. Which is ultimately what is needed for large scale DDoS handling purposes. While FreeBSD pf has improved significantly in performance over the years, and beats OpenBSD significantly on multi-core systems, there is still a lot of work to do there (or switch to a diff packet filter entirely) to make it multi-Mpps/new connections/sec capable.
He was able to take out my quad core 3.3ghz Haswell Intel i350-T2 8GiB memory baremetal 100Mb/100Mb firewall within seconds with 30Mb/s of traffic. All of which was being blocked and not logged.
Tell me how 30k pps of blocked traffic that was not being logged constitutes as a DDOS that will consume all resources of my entire box? I've done 70k pps ping floods against my firewall and it only consumes 5% cpu and nothing is affected. That ping flood is 0 packets dropped, max ping 10ms, avg ping 0.2ms.
But when he does a 30k pps of blocked TCP+UDP traffic, my box goes to crap and my admin interface goes offline to the point PFSense does not respond to ARP. And my admin interface isn't even the interface being hit, it's the WAN interface! They don't even share the same physical interface!
Stop down playing this issue. It's as bad as Jeep's "any one can control your car" issue. Luckily not many people are using it.
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Tell me how 30k pps of blocked traffic that was not being logged constitutes as a DDOS that will consume all resources of my entire box? I've done 70k pps ping floods against my firewall and it only consumes 5% cpu and nothing is affected. That ping flood is 0 packets dropped, max ping 10ms, avg ping 0.2ms.
But when he does a 30k pps of blocked TCP+UDP traffic, my box goes to crap and my admin interface goes offline to the point PFSense does not respond to ARP. And my admin interface isn't even the interface being hit, it's the WAN interface! They don't even share the same physical interface
Two things: increase your state table to 8M states. The UI and the rest of the box will be fine.
Second, the underlying issue is an IRQ interrupt flood. I'm not going to rehash it here, but it's the em driver flooding the CPU with interrupts. That's why only one core goes to 100%.
I've points this out several times on this thread, go back several pages to see my data an analysis. That's the root cause. Everything else on this thread is noise.
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@cmb:
I thought DTrace was getting nowhere because it requires ESF to include it in the version of freebsd they use with pfsense?
You need more than just dtrace, various other debug options like PMC, and it needs to be replicated on stock FreeBSD with as basic of a test case as possible.
I'll check out PMC as this is something I'm not familiar with or may know it by another name.
We're not holding anything up there if someone wants to do it right.
Not suggesting you /ESF are holding things up, but I was a bit surprised to find out that something like dtrace wasnt shipped as I recognise some things stock in freebsd is not needed for a pfsense/fw type of role or application, which then makes sense to not include in pfsense image, but imo Dtrace is useful especially when considering things like this. http://www.cybergrandchallenge.com/
Doing it right doesn't involve "watch my Youtube videos of what happens when I have a criminal botnet hit me with traffic I won't describe, using an undocumented configuration that's full of sub-optimal settings for standing up to resource exhaustion attacks."
I dont have enough data to know if it was criminal or not, but one way of looking at the use of criminal botnets is theres nothing like a real world test in some respects.
So it's clear what's being done, the end result, and how to replicate. There's no big secret in how to run a large scale SYN flood where the world would end if it was put out there.
@cmb:
It's all doable with hping or other tools. Supermule uses shady illegal services you pay for in Bitcoin that use criminal-run botnets. The same circumstance can be lab replicated without paying criminals.
Investigating this further is still on my radar. There have just been real problems that affect many reasonable real world use cases that have taken precedence. Anyone trying to stop DDoS with a firewall of any type is doing it wrong.
I havent been able to replicate yet internally which is why I'm taking a different approach atm before I get SM to hit me up again.
Bitcoins can be traced http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/07/fbi-bitcoin-pranked-silk-road fwiw.
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Two things: increase your state table to 8M states. The UI and the rest of the box will be fine.
Doesn't that require about 8GB of RAM? Who has that in their firewall?
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It actually takes 16GB to do that if all 8M is used.
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Who has that in their firewall?
RAM is cheap at this times 4 x 8 GB of ECC RAM is really payable for the masses, and why not?
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@KOM:
Two things: increase your state table to 8M states. The UI and the rest of the box will be fine.
Doesn't that require about 8GB of RAM? Who has that in their firewall?
I have 4GB of RAM and it worked without a hitch. Memory utilization was actually very low, <50% I believe. The raw data is buried somewhere in this thread.
I think, but cannot recall specifically, that it only hit about 4.7M states at the top end before the IRQ interrupt storm warning started. That's also why I think the state table never filled up.
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So you are not sure??
Just because I pissed you off…
I thought you were older than the "name calling" age.
Tell me what I used... And since you have offered little to no help at all in configuring these "sub optimal" configurations, its very clear to everybody that nothing good comes from ESF other than bickering and "sub optimal" communication.
If I really DDoS'ed you then you wouldnt be online yet.
@cmb:
@KOM:
So we can't expect the pfSense team to fix a problem that's not in pfSense, and they are at the mercy of the FreeBSD code releases.
While we can't expect them to, they certainly have fixed some FreeBSD bugs and submitted the patches upstream, which were accepted for inclusion by the FreeBSD team.
Yup. And if there were truly a world-is-ending issue here, we'd already have done the same already.
All firewalls require some degree of tuning to stand up to resource exhaustion attacks. Settings appropriate for such circumstances aren't defaults because they would break many more circumstances than they would help, as they're too aggressive for many VoIP configurations, among other possible problems. Also general default behaviors that most people want, like logging all blocked traffic, are really terrible in that circumstance. Among a variety of other problems I've pointed out with the scenarios in these threads.
I've seen enough of Supermule's super-secret DDoS stuff from when he DDoSed our forum several times (not going to believe it wasn't him), and some things I've gathered from others, to be able to put together a proper analysis to get upstream at some point.
It's all doable with hping or other tools. Supermule uses shady illegal services you pay for in Bitcoin that use criminal-run botnets. The same circumstance can be lab replicated without paying criminals.
Investigating this further is still on my radar. There have just been real problems that affect many reasonable real world use cases that have taken precedence. Anyone trying to stop DDoS with a firewall of any type is doing it wrong.
Brian, this is unacceptable.
Final warning. Be nice, or you are banned from this forum.
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I am nice.
But you would be pissed as well if you were accused of things you didnt do.
It goes both ways.
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How much power does the cycling monkey have?
Can it beat Chris Froome?
Should I hire it to pedal on the back of my tandem?I'll admit my shell scripts can't (yet?) pedal a bike. :)
You hired a power-cycling monkey?
No, I wrote one. :D
Borrowing the chaos monkey name.
Just scripting SNMP sets against an IP PDU to effectively yank the power plug, power it back up, wait for it to reply to pings, rinse and repeat. Many thousands of times. One box close to 20,000 times now, one over 10,000 times, others well into the thousands.
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Come on guys…
Clearly there is an issue and it
s not only caused by resource exaustion as cmb says. Mine went down with 3Mbps of traffic and I have 40/100 and 20/20 pipes. Everything went down and he didn
t even touch my internal webserver but firewall itself.Why can
t you work together, I
m really dissapointed in the way things went on this issue.pfSense is really cool and serious project and forums didn`t let me down since I first posted here (ok besides dok and his sarcasm which I got used to and it amuses me every time hehe ;) ) but I always got help or at least hint where to start.
Open source guys…
My 2c...
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I am nice.
But you would be pissed as well if you were accused of things you didnt do.
It goes both ways.
You may have been falsely accused. How you react to this is your choice.
There is a difference that seems to need need stating:
Chris is a co-owner, as am I. You are a guest.
While you are helpful, and respectful, you are welcome here. When that is no longer true, I will (and take this with all the requisite gravitas), remove you from this community. You will not return. I removed my former persona ("gonzopancho") in a way that I could not ever recover, because I found that I could no longer respond in a reasonable manner.
You have been far over "the line" of reasonable response on many occasions. This is your final warning. How you react is your choice.
I think you have value that you can bring, but your behavior in this and other things is, in the balance, largely negative toward the project and its owners.
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Come on guys…
Clearly there is an issue and it
s not only caused by resource exaustion as cmb says. Mine went down with 3Mbps of traffic and I have 40/100 and 20/20 pipes. Everything went down and he didn
t even touch my internal webserver but firewall itself.Why can
t you work together, I
m really dissapointed in the way things went on this issue.pfSense is really cool and serious project and forums didn`t let me down since I first posted here (ok besides dok and his sarcasm which I got used to and it amuses me every time hehe ;) ) but I always got help or at least hint where to start.
Open source guys…
My 2c...
The issue is resource exhaustion. The 'attack' (as it were) runs pf out of states. It is not (as some seem to want to state) related to virtualization or (as others seem to want to state) interrupt load on a single CPU.
To my knowledge, Brian has never shared his scripts/code, but we do have what I believe to be similar internally. We have shown (internally)
that the problem is endemic to the pf in FreeBSD. It is not specific to pfSense, or any 'forks' of same. I have not verified that the problem occurs on OpenBSD, or another 'stateful' firewall.The problem is not made worse by the lack of dtrace on the image.
Your disappointment is not inducement to work on the problem, nor am I aware of what you mean by "Open source guys…"
We, or someone else, will eventually fix the issue. It may be quite difficult. The pf codebase is not well-structured.
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Thing is Chris… Franco is very kind to people.
I dont really dig into the opnsense/pfsense feud since its meaningless.
I see. So is your assertion is that Brian/Supermule on forum.opnsense.org is not the same as Brian/Supermule on forum.pfsense.org?
Because if these are the same, then you said something quite different only two weeks ago:
https://forum.opnsense.org/index.php?topic=581.msg2799#msg2799
I take several issues with what you said:
Issue IMHO is that pfSense is nothing more than a name and logo.
I assert that this is false.
All the code and contributions are open source
This is true, and always has been.
and they want to change that so they can make money of other peoples work and contributions.
We have not changed that pfSense is open source, nor do we "want to change that". Your ugly accusation is false, Brian.
I dont like it and thats why I am here.
This is, of course, your choice, but I don't see why you feel allowed to be two-faced about it without challenge.
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Its not. Plenty of ressources left as you can see. Its routing and the way pf handles it.
The issue is different.
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OK, so 45 forum pages later, we have determined that there is a problem in pf that may or may not get fixed by someone sometime, perhaps.
Can we close this thread now already?
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Regardless of whether or not this low bandwidth DDOS traffic should be stopped upstream, 3 mbps of any kind of traffic should not render a modern business class firewall useless. Period.
The root issue being in FreeBSD pf doesn't changes that. And since pfSense is built on FreeBSD it is by extension a pfSense problem too.
What specific work has the pfSense project done with the FreeBSD project to resolve this specific issue and provide a fix?
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Regardless of whether or not this low bandwidth DDOS traffic should be stopped upstream, 3 mbps of any kind of traffic should not render a modern business class firewall useless. Period.
The root issue being in FreeBSD pf doesn't changes that. And since pfSense is built on FreeBSD it is by extension a pfSense problem too.
What specific work has the pfSense project done with the FreeBSD project to resolve this specific issue and provide a fix?
I outlined what we've done above. We have, what I believe to be, a similar program which can cause a similar issue.
If we develop a fix, we will attempt to upstream it to FreeBSD.
Right now, nobody is actively working on this "issue", because it is, fundamentally, a misapplication of technology.
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@KOM:
OK, so 45 forum pages later, we have determined that there is a problem in pf that may or may not get fixed by someone sometime, perhaps.
Can we close this thread now already?
+1
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@jwt:
Regardless of whether or not this low bandwidth DDOS traffic should be stopped upstream, 3 mbps of any kind of traffic should not render a modern business class firewall useless. Period.
The root issue being in FreeBSD pf doesn't changes that. And since pfSense is built on FreeBSD it is by extension a pfSense problem too.
What specific work has the pfSense project done with the FreeBSD project to resolve this specific issue and provide a fix?
I outlined what we've done above. We have, what I believe to be, a similar program which can cause a similar issue.
If we develop a fix, we will attempt to upstream it to FreeBSD.
Right now, nobody is actively working on this "issue", because it is, fundamentally, a misapplication of technology.
Is there a bug report with freebsd so we can keep tabs on it?
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Is there a bug report with freebsd so we can keep tabs on it?
Read this post: FreeBSD/pf and SYN ACK flooding. Then you'll understand why there's no upstream bug anywhere. (Unlike here, they've been able to stop the nonsense in just a single page, not 45 and counting… ::))
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@jwt:
Regardless of whether or not this low bandwidth DDOS traffic should be stopped upstream, 3 mbps of any kind of traffic should not render a modern business class firewall useless. Period.
The root issue being in FreeBSD pf doesn't changes that. And since pfSense is built on FreeBSD it is by extension a pfSense problem too.
What specific work has the pfSense project done with the FreeBSD project to resolve this specific issue and provide a fix?
I outlined what we've done above. We have, what I believe to be, a similar program which can cause a similar issue.
If we develop a fix, we will attempt to upstream it to FreeBSD.
Right now, nobody is actively working on this "issue", because it is, fundamentally, a misapplication of technology.
So in other words the pfSense project has not done specific work with the FreeBSD project to resolve this specific issue and provide a fix.
Could you please explain the fundamental misapplication of technology?
Thanks
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Is there a bug report with freebsd so we can keep tabs on it?
Read this post: FreeBSD/pf and SYN ACK flooding. Then you'll understand why there's no upstream bug anywhere. (Unlike here, they've been able to stop the nonsense in just a single page, not 45 and counting… ::))
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SYN_flood
Can we enquire considering the botnet element what solution is being considered?
A few thoughts on this, is if a server/service is behind an ip address where more than 1 ip address is available at a moments notice but not all ip's used, could existing states be maintained, whilst DNS is updated and services moved to another ip address a bit like the multiwan setup where wan1 is incoming and outgoing goes out on Wan2 for example.
If a server/service regularly only handles traffic from a specific region or country, could something like pfblocker be made to block anything from outside that region/country on the fly? I suspect this is why google diverts searchs to their local country domains.
What are the pro's/con's from having a recycled log of good ip addresses that have previously connected in the last x minutes or by some other pattern, which are allowed in automatically whilst the unknown ip addresses perhaps have a shorter timeout or treated with some other caution. Its possible to know that some IP address ranges will have good speed and latency by virtue of who is allocated them, whilst others may not, thinking mobile phone/satellite for the latter, so could something adaptive be considered?
Where would I find the failed ACK's being reported by pfsense in this scenario?
Edit: As theres a fundamental difference between the wiki link and this link http://security.radware.com/knowledge-center/DDoSPedia/syn-ack-flood/
namely the later appears to be exploiting out of order packets and the subsequent overhead processing them, although nothing can stop any amount of bandwidth domination irrespective of what its called be it flooding, (D)Dos, if the attacks by SM have been syn ack floods described in the 2nd link, as PF in freebsd handles this, will this not require a bit of a rewrite of the fundamentals of PF to speed up its handling of this situation? -
Read this post: FreeBSD/pf and SYN ACK flooding. Then you'll understand why there's no upstream bug anywhere. (Unlike here, they've been able to stop the nonsense in just a single page, not 45 and counting… ::))
So he refuses to provide the code that tickles this to FreeBSD's security team until some unknown condition is met. Got it.
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Read this post: FreeBSD/pf and SYN ACK flooding. Then you'll understand why there's no upstream bug anywhere. (Unlike here, they've been able to stop the nonsense in just a single page, not 45 and counting… ::))
So he refuses to provide the code that tickles this to FreeBSD's security team until some unknown condition is met. Got it.
If its a criminal botnet thats for hire, how can SM hand over the code?
At the same time, because someone has thought to test their own security arrangements by handing over some money to test, in this case pfsense protecting their systems, whilst also possibly testing the forums is not only testing their own security arrangements, but also testing the team behind the security product and the marketing claims.
In my books whilst the methods might be arguably criminal, it does show some level of ingenuity which perhaps shouldnt be denigrated and which is the lessor of two evils, testing the system and claims, or putting out there, duff solutions which threaten even more people and their businesses? 1 business or hundreds or thousands of businesses?
Its an interesting test of various claims none the less and pfsense have come out reasonably well imo, in that their servers are not down offline for any lengthy period of time and we appear to have got to the bottom of the problems with maybe some solutions under foot.
I've been the victim of CEO's lying about their products in the past, shifting blame onto other companies namely Microsoft and when called out for it, posts deleted. Shouldnt CEO's be called out for over hyping claims?
Edit. I am also not connected with SM and whilst I could quote shakespeare at myself, namely thy doth protest too much, the above is just another perspective on the whole situation, whether we like it or not.
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In my books whilst the methods might be arguably criminal, it does show some level of ingenuity which perhaps shouldnt be denigrated and which is the lessor of two evils, testing the system and claims…
Thanks for giving everyone on the intarweb permission to rootkit all your stuff.
PS–I never particularly liked Shakespeare.
;)